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I.
For more than two decades, American political science has been on
an interdisciplinary binge. Rocked by the discovery that the House
of Commons and the Supreme Court are not ubiquitous, baffled by
the evidence that written constitutions do not make democratic states,
and stunned by the recognition that Enlightenment values are not
universal, venturesome political scientists left the professional reser-
vation seeking better guides to understanding. If the conventional
wisdom were so wanting, they seemed to say,' then why not try a bit
* This review was written while the author was on research and writing leav.e 
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In acknowledging such support, I do not wish to suggest that the views herein x-pressed
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-- Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science, Yale 
University. AXB. 1947, A.M.
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1. Most writers who have explored the critical self-appraisal from which the discipline
is now emerging correctly associate it with the aftermath of World War II. The 
war
itself was the second demonstration in the twentieth century that neither Rational Man
nor the democratic constitutions he might devise could create political stability. In addi-
tion, the far-flung military commitments of the United States brought many 
who were
or would become political scientists face to face with the more "exotic" political systems
of Asia and Africa. These factors made it inevitable, I believe, that post-war political
science would engage in a restless intellectual stock-taking and that 
the most ad en-
turous explorations of other disciplines would occur in comparative politics.
The literature describing this postwar intellectual history is too Vast to ate here. ex-
cept by example. Sigmund Neumann's Comparative Politics: A Half-Century 
Aptraisal,
19 J. PoL. 369 (1957), remains the best short treatment available. A more comprehensive
essay on the history of comparative politics is found in Eckstein. A Perspective on Com-
parative Politics, Past and Present, in ComPA. %AT' PoLTrics: A READEn 3 
(H. Eckstein
& D. Apter eds. 1963). The "indictment" against a "traditional" comparative politics 
was
first fully articulated in R. MACRIDiS, THE STUDY OF CoMPrARATI','E GoV'.ese Eu r (1955).
One of the earliest articles alerting the profession to the need for more understanding 
of
the political systems and processes of "exotic" countries is Kahin, Pauker 8- Pye. Comn-
parative Politics of Non-Western Countries, in CO.MPARATIVE POLITIcs: 
NOTEs AND READ-
INGs 539 (R. Macridis 8 B. Brown eds. d ed. 1968). The most thorough revicw and inter-
pretation of evolutionary trends in postwar comparative politics 
is offered by D. Apter.
Comparative Government: Developing New Nations, in PO.IICAL SCIENcE: ADVANCE OF
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of sociology and anthropology here, taste some psychology there, and
indulge in an occasional, if timorous, nip of economics in between-
just for the intellectual hell of itl
Compared with the staples of political science, the exotic fruits of
other disciplines proved to be heady stuff indeed. It was not long be-
fore one heard raucus demands that political science go behavioral,
build typologies, and cross fertilize. Political scientists were urged to
beware of legalism, to study ecology, to learn mathematics, to con-
struct paradigms and to locate parameters.2 Yet nothing is more re-
vealing of the other man's scholarly brew than the savoring of it. We
-many or most of us-awakened from this extended trip with pain-
ful interdisciplinary hangovers.
Samuel Huntington's latest book3 is not to be viewed as the func-
tional equivalent of an Alcoholics Anonymous manual for the profes-
sion. It is clear, however, that he has an understanding of the central-
ity of politics which should help return political scientists, presently
suffering from a severe case of the intellectual d.t.s, to a more sober
outlook toward their subject and a more balanced approach to study-
ing it. Huntington seems to be saying to his colleagues:
[I]f you persist in ignoring the central role of politics, you will be
weakened by your addiction to other disciplines. Use them in
moderation or not at all. Bear in mind that not all the formulae
passed down by the ancients were culture-bound or intellectually
sterile.
This service to the discipline is so great-and will be so greatly appre-
ciated-that it must continually be borne in mind as I take issue with
THE DISCIPLINE 82 (M. Irish ed. 1968). It provides a full overview of the transformations
which the profession has experienced since 1945.
2. Again, there is more literature on this phenomenon than it is necessary to cite.
One may usefully consult K. DEtrrSCH, THE NERVS OF GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL (1963); D. EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYsTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE STATE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1953); ESSAYS ON THE BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF POLITICS
(A. Ranney ed. 1962); H. EuLAU, THE BEHAVIORAL PERSUASION IN POLITICS (1963); TIE
LrMrrs OF BEHAVIORALISM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (J. Charlesworth ed. 1962); THE POLITICS
OF DEVELOPING AREAS (G. Almond & J. Coleman eds. 1960); F. Rzcas, ADMINISTRATION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY (1964); G. SCHIIUBERT, QUANTITA-
TIrVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); and Dal, The Behavioral Approach in Po.
litical Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest, 55 Am. POL. Sc REv.
763 (1961).
It should be understood, as will no doubt be apparent as this essay proceeds, that I do
not view all of this advice as damaging, or all of the consequences of interdisciplinary
excursions as fruitless. See, e.g., LaPalombara, Macrotheories and Microapplications in
Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm, 1 COMP. POL. 52 (1968).
3. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968) [hereinafter
cited as HUNTINGTON].
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many of the particular observations Huntington offers in this extraor-
dinarily interesting and provocative volume.
Political Order in Changing Societies is essentially a book about
nation-building, denominated "political development," "political mod-
ernization" and a great many other things in the recent avalanche of
writing on the subject.4 Huntington's central thesis might be sum-
marized as follows:
Existing governmental institutions are praiseworthy, provided that
those who man them have the power to govern. The "developed"
political system is the strong and capable, or institutionalized, po-
litical system. Any evaluation of the merits of democracy and dic-
tatorship, public and private interests, free and plebescitarian elec-
tions, or civilian and military control, is likely to be normative
and misleading as far as our comprehension of political develop-
ment is concerned.
The above synopsis would be inaccurate and unjust, quite possibly
a caricature of what Huntington is about. But caricatures may illumi-
nate as well as distort-as has often been pointed out, they illuminate
precisely because they distort. Huntington's single-minded focus on
the instititionalized power of political structures does lead him to for-
mulate a theory of questionable general validity. It encourages him to
identify the political party as a possible, but improbable, deus ex ma-
china for resolving both the contemporary problems of nation-building
and what I sense are Huntington's own normative or moral dilemmas
regarding what he writes. Before spelling out this thesis, the state of
the literature on political development must be examined, for it is in
part against this literature that Huntington's book is written.
II.
As students of comparative politics witnessed the dizzying prolifera-
tion of new nations and the almost universal impulse to modernize
that followed the demise of colonialism, "political development" be-
came one of their central concerns. Political scientists asked themselves,
"How does political development occur? What sequence does it fol-
low? What are its causes? What are its consequences?"
In exploring these questions, it was generally, perhaps excessively,
4. Huntington's opening sentence identifies the central theme around which his argu-
ments develop. "The most important political distinction among countries," he says,
"concerns not their form of government but their degree of government." HuN,-,mcrON 1.
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agreed that the formalistic approaches of the past would not be very
helpful. Legal and institutional concepts were seen as culture-bound
and aridly descriptive. Because the boxes, categories, concepts and
labels were neither accurate descriptions nor satisfactory explanations
of politics in less developed countries, political scientists were tempted
to experiment with the approaches of sister disciplines. Yet the wisdom
of other disciplines proved less useful than expected, even though ex-
perience with them led to considerable progress in empirical theory
and methods.
A persistent and fundamental problem is the obscurity and ambi-
guity of the term "political development." Many scholars have seemed
to define political development in terms of non-political indicators like
economic modernity.5 Others say that urbanization and literacy are
preconditions and salient characteristics of development, again sug-
gesting that political advancement hinges on non-political transforma-
tions in society." Still others emphasize patterns of social stratification,
mobility, and the differentiation of roles as factors affecting and de-
scribing a developed political system.7
Many efforts to forge a general theory in this field are further marred
by a persistent political ethnocentrism. Some writers explicitly intend
to equate the "developed" political system with the governmental in-
stitutions of England and America. Others do the same thing implic-
itly, which is worse. Theoretical formulations of both kinds treat as
"developed" those polities that may be roughly described as pluralistic
democracies and consider all other polities either underdeveloped or
developmental aberrations. Despite efforts at scientific objectivity, the
temptation remains great to measure "development" in terms of the
extent "they" are, or are not, becoming more like "us.""
Much of this difficulty stems from the fact that many political sci-
entists have hastily concluded that American sociological theory is less
5. In the summaries that follow in this section, I will cite illustrative examples rather
than trying to list exhaustively the authors who fall into each of the categories. Two
places where the problem of defining "political development" is fruitfully discussed are
L. PYE, ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1966) and Chong.do Hah & Schneider,
A Critique of Current Studies of Political Development and Modernization, 35 SOCIAL
RESEARCH 130 (1968).
6. See, e.g., D. LERNER, THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: MODERNIZING TIlE MID-
DLE EAST (1958).
7. See, e.g., D. AI'ER, THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION (1965); F. RIGcs, ADmINisTRA-
TION IN DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES: THE THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY (1964); E. StIas, PO-
LIRICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW STATES (1962).
8. Those who have pondered the American middle-class approach to ameliorating
the conditions of our decaying cities will recognize the domestic symptoms of this enervat-
ing intellectual disease.
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value-laden, less parochial and more scientific than political science
itself.9 This belief is largely nonsense, and the sooner we recognize
that obvious fact, the sooner we can hope to go beyond the parochial-
ism that masquerades as science and flits about creating confusion be-
hind a smokescreen of questionable wisdom articulated in barbaric
neologisms.
Whatever may be its merits for the study of society, sociological
theory has had a number of unfortunate consequences for the study
of political development. First, it has encouraged political scientists
to devote too much attention to the study of total systems. It would
be nice to have a general theory of political systems, but we must
avoid assuming that there can be little fruitful theorizing or research
that is not based on or derived from a general theory of politics. If
that were so, it would be logical to infer that there can be no satisfy-
ing or persuasive theories of politics that do not stem from a general
theory of society. In practice, such strictures turn out to be invitations
to a latter-day scholasticism which is not less arid, not less empirically
useless, and certainly not less unedifying than the scholasticism at
which legal scholars have been expert since the time of the Roman
lawyers and glossators.' 0
Second, sociological theory has led many to the erroneous belief that
there are concepts and theories of sociology that are scientifically ob-
jective, or value-free. Without belaboring the point, it may be men-
tioned that a construct as seemingly objective as "stratification theory"
9. I have presented this argument elsewhere in more detail. See LaPalombara, Theory
and Practice in Development Administration: Observations on the Role of the Ciilian
Bureaucracy, September 1966 (mimeographed contribution to the Brookings Institution
Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Political Development); LaPalombara, Public
Administration and Political Change: A Theoretical Overuiew, in E.MPATHY AND IDEoLOGY:
ASP-rs OF ADMI,1NISTRATIVE INNOVATION 74 (C. Press & A. Arian eds. 1966).
10. See LaPalombara, Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: 1
Widening Chasm, 1 CO.MP. POL. 52 (1968), for an elaboration of these remarks. A striking
example of the unnecessary use of general sociological theory is IL HOLT & J. Turwrt.
TrE Por.rrcAL BAsIs OF ECONOMic DEVELOr. MENT (1966). The authors are to be coin-
mended, however, for treating political institutions as independent variables affecting
change.
Marion J. Levy, Jr., is one sociologist who is dubious about the quality of general
theories in sociology and political science, conscious of the gap between abstract formula-
tions and empirical applications, and courageous in his efforts to evaluate the contribu-
tion which his own theory makes to empirical research. See M. LEVY, TitE SnrucruFm or So.
crmer (1952); M. Lavy, MODERNIZATION AND THE STRx1cTuRE or Socr-ry: A SETmNo ront
INTERNATIONAL AFFARmS (1966). AS Apter noted, however, "Both Parsons and Levy would
.* require us to make a systematic study of an entire society, from its work habits to
its leisure activities, from its kinship groups to the ideas held by competing subgroups,
before they would permit us to make an effective analysis of politics.' D. A Ea, TirE
POITrICS OF MODERNIZATION 231 (1965). One instinctively agrees with Apter that this may
be asking too much of the political scientist and that perhaps he would be better ad-
vised to begin by studying governmentl
1257
The Yale Law Journal
is the subject of considerable controversy among sociologists. It is
doubtful in fact whether Max Weber himself believed that there could
be a non-normative social science. Indeed, the profession of sociology
is currently undergoing an agonizing reappraisal of its smug scientific
posture."
Third, the emphasis on sociology has made it difficult or impossible
for many social scientists to recognize the inaccuracy or falseness of
their observations of American and Western societies.12 When one be-
gins with an abstract typology, he tends to squeeze reality into the
boxes, no matter how implausible or ludicrous the fit. Ideal types force
us to seek empirical approximations, even after we have recited the
litany about how far from reality such constructs are likely to be. It
thus turns out, for example, that scholars take to believing that systems
of public administration in the West really function as Weberian legal-
rational authority systems. Scholars and policy advisers then prepare
and peddle administrative manuals to help developing countries
modernize. Similarly, scholars have taken the "pattern variables" of
Talcott Parsons and assumed, first, that to "develop" means to maxi-
mize the achievement-universalism-functionally specific-affectively neu-
tral-collectivity orientation side of the dichotomous Parsonian vari-
ables,'3 and second, that Western social and political systems are close
approximations of what Parsons described abstractly.
To be sure, everyone will agree that most empirical situations are
mixed and do not correspond neatly to abstract typologies or idealiza-
tions. Such modest concessions, however, do not make the problem of
finding useful typologies any easier, nor do they tell us whether we
11. See, e.g., C. MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (1959); M. STEIN & A. VInIcit,
SOCIOLOGY ON TRIAL (1963). In the latter volume, Barrington Moore correctly says
of Weber: "To my knowledge he never implied either in word or in deed that social
science should withdraw from burning political issues, though he did feel that there
were limits to what science, strictly conceived, could contribute to their solution," Id. 70-
71. I would add that Weber considered the notion that there could be a science of culture
both "meaningless" and "senseless." M. WEBER, ON THE METHODOLOGY OF TIHE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 49-112 (H. Finch & E. Shils transls. 9- eds. 1949).
12. One very telling example of this phenomenon is the sociological outpouring of
the 1950's concerning the "disappearance" of ideological politics and the reasons for this
purported (and, in light of the experience of the 1960's, either inaccurately perceived,
misunderstood, or very temporary) political transformation. See W. CONNOLLY, POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY (1967); THE END OF THE IDEOLOGY DEBATE (C. Waxman ed. 1968).
13. The "pattern variables" are explained in T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951);
T. PARSONS, R. BALES & E. SHILS, WORKING PAPERS IN THE THEORY OF AcrION (1953) and
T. PARSONS & E. SHILS, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION (1953). It should be added
that Parsons, like Weber, cannot be held responsible for all of the intellectual mischief
sociologists and political scientists have committed in his name. Furthermore, It cannot
be denied that his work has served the important purpose of helping to make an entire
generation of political scientists less parochial and less woodenly "institutional" in their
research.
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have identified the most useful indicators of what "political develop-
ment" means and how nations get or can get that way. To summarize
this third point, there is little reason to suppose that our understand-
ing of political development will be improved merely by replacing the
abstract, culture-bound, empirically untenable formulations of the legal
profession with their equivalents in sociology or in any other disci-
pline.
Fourth and most unhappily, sociological theory has led a whole gen-
eration of political scientists to treat political processes and systems as
dependent variables. In such formulations, it seems that political events
are more or less fatalistically determined by factors in the environment
-by parametric conditions, ecological forces, or "inputs" into the
polity. To discover the basis of a political system under this scheme,
one examines patterns of socialization, per capita gross national prod-
uct, model personalities, religious practices, belief systems, the struc-
ture of the family, class relationships, the diffusion of the mass media,
patterns of economic exchange, literacy, or urbanization. In short, one
considers every assumption except one-that law, political institutions,
and public policies are important in determining the shape of the
polity over time. Even where the theories of sociology, economics, an-
thropology, or psychology are elegant and the research itself is meth-
odologically impeccable, we continue to find ourselves viewing polit-
ical development in a questionable deterministic framework in which
the influential factors are almost everything except what is political.1 4
14. Examples of deterministic approaches abound, in and out of political science, and
a deterministic bias can often be found even in works of superior quality. I cite these
writings merely to provide examples of theoretical approaches that state or imply that
politics is the product of other independent factors.
Economic determinism is evident in A. ORGANsEr, THE STAGES Or Po.rTcAL DEvE.op-
MENT (1965) and W. Rosow, THE STAGES OF EcoNo.Isc GRowthi: A Nox Co~u-Iusr
MANIFEFSTO (1960). Even more dubious attempts to associate certain aggregated economic
variables with certain kinds of political systems are to be found in S. Lwsur, PoLrncA.
MAN (1959); B. RussErr, H. ALER, K. Datnscu & H. LASSWELL, Wonw HANDrOOK OF
POLITICAL AND SocLAL I. DxcAoRs (1964); Cutright, National Political Development: Mea-
surement and Analysis, 28 A3. Soc. Rv. 253 (1963); and Tanter, Toward a Theory of
Political Development, 11 MmWEsr J. PoL. Sc. 145 (1967). Psychological determinism is
suggested by E. HAGEN, ON = THEORY OF SocIAL CHANGE (1962) and D. MCCLELLAND,
THE ACESVUG SocIErY (1961). OLD SocIEriEs AND NEw STATES (C. Gecrtz ed. 1963) and
POLITICAL fODERNIZATION: A READER IN COMPARATIVE PoLlric.r L CiHANGE (C. WVelch ed.
1967) contain examples of sociological determinism.
It is essential to add that the Social Science Research Council Committee on Compara.
tive Politics, with which I have been identified for some years, has not only contributed
to the vogue which determinism has enjoyed: it has probably been a leader in giving
prominence to the approach. See, eg., BUREAUCRACY ANT POLTICAL DEvELoP., %.,-r (J. La-
Palombara ed. 1963); COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL DEVMOPMEN"r (L. Pye ed. 1963);
EDUCATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (J. Coleman ed. 1965); Pouricm. CULTUrE A.ND
POLICAL DEVELOPMNT (L. Pye & S. Verba eds. 1965); THE PoLrrCs OF DEV.LOPINc
ARES (G. Almond &- J. Coleman eds. 1960).
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The fact that much of this determinism is both wrong and vulgar
cannot be obscured by the recent proliferation of quantitative studies
of political development, however sophisticated. We have been in-
undated with factor analyses and extensive considerations of inputs
and outputs that might be correlated, but no one has attempted to
peer into the "black box" of government, which remains mysterious
and intractable. In the process, otherwise sensible men have been dis-
tracted from what should be the political scientist's central focus-
government, politics, and their consequences for social and political
change.
III.
Against this backdrop, Political Order in Changing Societies would
be a welcome change even were it not such an extraordinary example
of general erudition, wide-ranging knowledge of politics and shrewd
insights into historical processes. Political scientists who have won-
dered whatever became of Aristotle, Plato, Bodin and Montesquieu
will find them reappearing in this volume, more intellectually relevant
than often before. Huntington has a healthy respect for the ancients.
He marshals them, as needed, to demonstrate that important insights
into the complex phenomena of politics did not emerge fullblown
from the brows of Durkheim, Weber or Talcott Parsons. As one fol-
lows Huntington over several hundred pages, it is equally plain that
perhaps the least cited but most present spirit is that of Machiavelli,
who gave more useful nation-building advice than perhaps all of
modern political science and political sociology combined.
The elements are wrapped in a prose style distinguished by a felic-
itous absence of neologisms and an intoxicating cadence of expression.
The work itself is in part an elaboration of several previously-pub-
lished articles, one of which has been widely cited and represents Hunt-
ington's antidote for the ills of contemporary political science.1 , But
there is more from Huntington here that represents additional and
important observations on such matters as revolution and violence,
reform-mongering and corruption. In the fullest sense, Huntington's
theory of political change is rounded out in this important volume.
The message is that unilinear assumptions about development are
untenable and that the concept of development must allow for "decay"
15. Huntington, Political Development and Political Decay, 17 WoRL POL. 386 (1965).
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as well as for progress. As the facts of national histories of turmoil and
instability dearly indicate, progress is not inevitable, and the concept
of development must allow for its opposite-for retrograde steps as
well as for stasis.
What then is the hallmark of political development? How do we
identify a developed political system if we happen to see one? Hunt-
ington's reply is deceptively simple. It involves first drawing a distinc-
tion between modernization and development and second gauging
the relationship between certain kinds of changes in society and the
ability of political leaders and institutions to cope with these changes
in a stable manner. 6
Huntington identifies modernization as economic and social trans-
formations that tend to bring new participants into the political sphere.
Whether he is discussing the breakdown of feudalism and the onset
of industrialization in Europe or contemporary transformations in
African and Asian countries, Huntington provides unimpeachable
evidence that the processes of economic and social modernization
tend greatly to complicate the problem of governance. One of the
dilemmas he underscores, therefore, is that modernization is not
merely quite different from political development: in a sense, it must
be viewed as incompatible with it. The incompatibility will not be
permanent, to be sure, but it will certainly be found in the early stages
of any transformation that encourages a proliferation and diversifica-
tion of the number of "social forces" in society.
These social forces interact and find themselves in conflict. Political
decay will ensue unless conflict can be moderated, excesses prevented,
order maintained and the social forces integrated into existing or
modified political institutional arrangements. As Huntington remarks,
"A political organization... is an arrangement for maintaining order,
resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and thus promoting
community among two or more social forces."'17 Clearly, then, a polity
may be more or less developed at any point in its history depending
on the ability of governmental organizations and those who man them
to handle the destabilizing impact of modernization.
Huntington suggests that the level of development is properly to be
gauged by assessing the relationship between political participation
and political institutionalization. Institutionalization itself he would
16. Stability is one of Huntington's overriding values. Unlike so man)y of the vulgar
economic determinists, however, he takes great pains to debunk the idea that political
stability will follow from an amelioration of economic conditions.
17. HUN=nGrON 8-9.
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measure along the following four dimensions-adaptability-rigidity,
complexity-simplicity, autonomy-subordination and coherence-dis-
unity.18 Considering specific governmental organizations in light of
these variables, Huntington reaches the somewhat surprising conclu-
sion that those organizations are the more institutionalized (that is,
capable of governing) that are older, more complex, more independent
of social groupings, and more unified and coherent in their purposes
and procedures. Where institutionalized governmental bodies and pat-
terns of political participation are in reasonably good balance, the
political system may be described as "civic." Where participation out-
runs the capacity of political institutions to contain it, the system may
be described as "praetorian."'19
Having set forth this typology, Huntington ranges far and wide in
search of illustrations of various and changing levels of political de-
velopment. His chapter on the relationship between traditional polit-
ical systems and the capacity to absorb modernization and channel its
consequences politically is a brilliant tour de force, the best and most
lucid synthesis I have read of a great deal of important work on this
subject since World War II. One of his typically thought-provoking
generalizations is that while traditional systems with highly centralized
authority are better able to further and to absorb economic and social
modernity, they are paradoxically less able than traditional systems of
diffuse, decentralized authority to handle the consequences of such
changes for political participation. Because modernization will often
require concentration of power, even in one man, it is more likely to
move ahead where institutional arrangements permit an absolute mon-
arch of seventeenth-century Europe, or a modem Ataturk or a Shah
of Iran, to effect changes untrammeled by constitutional (or other)
limitations of power. The other side of the coin, however, is that these
same polities will be less able than others to assimilate into their polit-
ical systems the new social classes, forces or groupings to which mod-
ernization gives rise. Huntington cites the contrasts between European
Continental countries and England, between China and Japan, and
between Ruanda and Urundi as evidence for this generalization.2 0
From the standpoint of maintaining political stability, his conclusion
is that





Vol. 78: 1253, 1969
Book Reviews
tional political system, the less violent is its political moderniza-
tion and the more easily it adapts to the broadening of political
participation .... Paradoxical as it may seem, dispersed or feu-
dal traditional systems characterized by rigid social stratification
and little social mobility more often give birth to modern democ-
racy than do the more differentiated, egalitarian, open and fluid
bureaucratic traditional systems with their highly centralized
power.21
Huntington's prediction regarding the future of contemporary na-
tions ruled by traditional monarchies-for example, Morocco, Iran
and Thailand-is very bleak indeed. Modernization, he argues, will
tend to cause upheavals precisely because concentrated power is un-
able to handle increases in participation, and the impulse to economic
and social modernity cannot be denied. In the face of the perplexing
instabilities which are almost certain in such systems,2 2 Huntington
offers a number of possible alternative political strategies, encompass-
ing essentially everything from centralized repressions to violent rev-
olution-without making it sufficiently clear which of the solutions he
would counsel. He does note at one point that "[s]ome existing societies
with traditional monarchies... may be too backward even for revolu-
tion,"2 but in any event institutionalized power and order remain the
overriding political desiderata for him, so that even in the case of
revolution he would expect a "modern party dictatorship" to result.
Perhaps the most suggestive chapter in this volume is that dealing
with "praetorian" political systems, more particularly with the inter-
vention of the military in politics. The overall proposition he offers
us is this: in early stages of modernization, the military plays a radical
role; as modernization proceeds and a middle class emerges, the mili-
tary shifts to the role of arbiter among social forces; when moderniza-
tion produces symptoms of the "mass society," the military is trans-
formed into the conservative guardian of the status quo.24
Huntington insists that the military aid and military training pro-
vided for some developing countries by the U.S. are not responsible
for the intervention of the military of these countries in politics. He
considers such forms of assistance to other countries "politically ster-
ile. '25 Almost by definition rather than reflection he concludes that







The Yale Law Journal
political leaders and institutions cannot deal with problems of public
policy. He seems to say that the military will remain aloof from pol-
itics whenever the civilian political leadership can demonstrate its
capacity to maintain disciplined control over participation.20 The
image of the military he conveys is that of a group which strongly
identifies with a "guardianship" role and is essentially reluctant to
become enmeshed in the political fray. Indeed, he insists that once
this happens the military are faced with a limited number of alter-
natives, one of which is to be dragged into increasingly repressive
measures, another of which is to accept increased political participa-
tion while being very careful to guide it.27 He acknowledges, however,
that the military is rarely effective as a modernizing instrument and
that military leaders, having seized political power, tend indeed to
cause their countries to sink ever deeper into a state of praetorian-
ism. 28
This analysis raises a variety of problems. First, one may question
the motivations for political intervention which Huntington assigns
to the military. Huntington is less forcefully skeptical than he might
be about the possibly misleading or euphemistic nature of the mili-
tary's self-image as a "guardian" force, although he does recognize
that after modernization is partially accomplished the military may
step in to limit the effective integration of masses into the political
process. His antipathy toward the praetorian society lies precisely in
his prediction that it brings out the worst in both civilian and mili-
tary leaders, encourages corruption and makes the institution exercise
of responsible political power unlikely.
A second problem involves important contradictions in Hunting-
ton's analysis of this matter. At one point, for example, he remarks
that military intervention usually occurs at the culmination of a period
of violence. 29 Such a statement would be consistent with what I have
noted above. We would then see the military as essentially selfless pro-
fessionals, dedicated to their countries, and reluctantly compelled to
enter politics primarily when the paralysis or failure of civilian polit-
ical institutions and leaders emanate in violence. The model is both
too neat and too dubious as far as the facts of politics are concerned.
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a dynamic role that places the military "above" politics. 3° It is too du-
bious in that it overlooks a proliferation of instances in which such
intervention did not occur at the end of a period of violence, a pos-
sibility which Huntington himself apparently recognizes in his
acknowledgment that the military will also engage in "veto inter-
ventions."31 The two circumstances where he expects a "veto inter-
vention" to occur are instructive. Military forces may jump in, he
says, when they fear that a party they oppose will succeed at the polls.
Or they may step in when power holders turn "radical" and begin to
effect policies designed to appeal to groups that the military would
prefer to keep at the margins of the power structure. Clearly, both of
these cirumstances are a far cry from the role which would be played
by guardian-type military officers, committed to the system (whatever
that is) and dragged into politics only when imminent retrogression
to a Hobbesian state of nature requires it. As recent events in widely-
scattered countries like Greece, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Sudan
attest, acting as "guardian" or "savior," protecting the "national in-
terest" or restoring "order," often mean that the military will deny
freedoms and perhaps life as well to those whose interests and demands
it opposes.
It seems to me that Huntington's ambivalence about the military
derives directly from his central concern with institutionalized polit-
ical order and his quite persuasive view that the middle class and in-
telligentsia in modernizing countries will be unable to cope with the
consequences of economic and social change. Indeed, he makes the
strongest case for the suggestion that the military will probably be
led to intervene precisely because neither the middle class nor the
intelligentsia will understand that the only way to prevent revolution-
ary upheaval is to integrate the peasantry into the total process of
political, economic and social change.
Although he displays few illusions about the consequences of mili-
tary intervention, Huntington is also realistic in expecting moderniza-
tion to lead to a proliferation of such intervention. He correctly notes
that the peasantry is essentially revolutionary because its demands
tend to be redistributive.32 Because economic growth requires that
30. Huntington may not have intended this inference, for he is interested in a general
delineation of military roles at varying stages of economic, social and political moderniza-
tion. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that few groups that have seized political power
have failed to rationalize their often violent intervention by using one variation or
another of the "guardianship" concept.
51. Id. 223.32. Id. 298-SO2,
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political elites resist such demands and because economic development
may actually increase inequality in the short run, failure to harness
and direct peasant energies will almost certainly lead to the kind of
instability-perhaps violence-that will bring the military forcefully
into politics. In these circumstances, we would confront a dramatic
example of demands for participation that existing political institu-
tions are unable to handle. Whether destabilizing changes are con-
sciously pursued by centralized authorities or by localized forces, the
revolutionary implications of the proliferation of such factors and
forces will require that an efficient and effective bureaucratic organiza-
tion like the military step in to restore some modicum of stability.
If one wishes to exclude the military from politics, another institu-
tion must be found to provide the needed stability. For Huntington,
that institution is the political party. If modernization leads to greater
demands for political participation and traditional political arrange-
ments are ill-equipped to manage this problem, the alternative to the
military and its limited techniques of management is the political
party. As Huntington puts it, "At some point, political parties become
necessary to organize and to structure the expanded participation, but
these parties play a secondary role supplementing institutional strength
rather than filling an institutional vacuum."38
The most persistent theme in this book centers on the potential
of the political party for accelerating modernization while at the same
time maintaining order. The theme is essentially Leninist, and much
of what Lenin said about the instrumental value of the party in What
Is To Be Done?3 4 reverberates throughout this volume. For Hunting-
ton, it is Lenin and not Marx who understood the enormous impor-
tance of institution-building in political development. Communist
movements, he claims, have not been so much distinguished by their
revolutionary capacities as they have been marked by their ability to
create, after revolutions, "modem governments based on mass partic-
ipation in politics."3 5 As he puts it, in one of the many aphorisms
strewn throughout the book, "The political function of Communism
is not to overthrow authority but to fill the vacuum of authority."' ,
Lenin rather than Marx, Huntington would maintain, had the more
ingenious insight into the dynamics of development. Marx was wrong
in viewing social class as central to a theory of change. Lenin, not
33. Id. 399.
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Marx's disciple but his perfector, "stood Marx on his head" in that
he understood the critical importance of organizing and disciplining
the masses. For, according to Huntington, government is a matter of
political institutions and not of social forces. "Parties rule and not
classes: a dictatorship must be the dictatorship of a party even if it
is in the name of a class."37 "Marxism," he adds, "is a theory of his-
tory. Leninism is a theory of political development. It deals with the
bases of political mobilization, the methods of political institutionaliza-
tion, the foundations of public order."38
Whether he is discussing the difficult process of effecting land re-
form,39 the need for establishing control of peasant participation in
politics, or the general problem of integrating primordial social forces
into a single national political community, Huntington continually
emphasizes the utility of a political party. The party must be strong
and centralized, for it becomes (or may become) in developing coun-
tries the latter-day substitute for the highly centralized, absolute mon-
archies of the past. That such party systems may involve only a single
party without competition for power is of much less concern to him
than the possibility that "social forces" may enter the political arena
insufficiently guided and disciplined.40 Where highly developed tradi-
tional institutions could help absorb the impact and the tremors
caused by additional participation, as in Europe, the party might be
seen as playing a supplementary or even a secondary role.4' But in
later cases of modernization, where political elites are faced by essen-
tially unprecedented "crisis loads" 42 and lack the well developed tra-
ditional institutions which might assist them in managing conflicts,
the party is the most obvious and most needed instrument of further
development. Huntington then returns to a discussion of the marked
success of Communist states in understanding this priority, adding
37. Id. 34.
38. Id. 342.
39. Id. ch. 6.
40. Huntington is concerned that new groups not enter the political system without
having learned to play by the existing rules of the game. In addition, he appears to
have adopted the concept of "interest aggregation" formulated earlier by Almond and
his colleagues on the S.S.R.C. Committee on Comparative Politics. See, e.g., PorrcAz.
CtrLTuRE AND PoLrxcAL DE .. OPMENT (L. Pye & S. Verba eds. 1965); Tiu PoLrmcs or
D vx.opno AREAS (G. Almond & J. Coleman eds. 1960).
41. HUNTmGTON 399.
42. The notion of "crisis loads" as a distinctive aspect of problems in contemporary
nation-building has been widely discussed. Like the concept of interest aggregation. it
has been central to the writings of the SS.R.C. Committee on Comparative Politics
noted above. "Crises of participation" are specifically treated in the introductory and
concluding chapters of PoLrTcAL PARTIES AND POT'ICAL DEvELOP.r.EN-r (J. LaPalombara &
M. Weiner eds. 1966). Cf. MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAmics OF GRoWru (M. "Weiner ed.
1966).
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that "the more successful efforts at modernization by non-communist,
one-party states have also given first priority to political objectives.
'41
Turkey and Tunisia are cited as examples of this latter phenomenon,
just as Turkey, under Kemal, is viewed as an excellent example of
reform-mongering where "blitzkrieg" tactics are used, not in support
of whole programs of reform, but to promote single facets of such
programs.
Huntington proceeds to an illuminating discussion of the arguments
against parties in the developing countries and to a consideration of
the evolutionary phases that seem to characterize party systems. He is
persuasive in his remarks that the suppression of parties has explosive
long-term implications, that many of the objections to parties are
really objections to weak parties, and that, in general, military inter-
vention will vary inversely with the strength of political parties.41 He
is somewhat less persuasive, but always articulate, when he suggests
that from the standpoint of political development what counts is not
the number of parties but the strength and adaptability of the party
system.45 Where he examines evidence regarding the relationship be-
tween political instability and the number of parties present in a coun-
try, he is led to conclude that overall one-party and two-party systems
are to be preferred if stability is being sought.46 In terms of his basic
concern for the peaceful integration of new social forces into the pol-
ity, he concedes that in late-modernizing societies, multi-party systems
are acceptable where they are successful in incorporating a large num-
ber of such forces into the system.
We can conclude this brief overview of Huntington's argument by
juxtaposing two of his remarks, one referring to the persistent threat
to political stability represented by the "Green Uprising" (i.e., the
entrance of peasants into politics), the other summarizing the poten-
tially creative role of the party:
The rural-urban gap may be bridged by revolutionaries or by
a military elite which consciously appeals to and organizes the
countryside. But the assimilation of the rural masses can also be
the product of the working of parties and the party system either
through the struggle of a nationalist party against colonial rule
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A strong party system has the capability, first, to expand par-
ticipation through the system and thus to preempt or to divert
anomie or revolutionary political activity, and, second, to mod-
erate and channel the participation of newly mobilized groups
in such a manner as not to disrupt the system. A strong party sys-
tem thus provides the institutionalized organizations and proce-
dures for the assimilation of new groups into the system. The
development of such party institutions is the prerequisite for
political stability in the modernizing countries.48
IV.
One of the major weaknesses in this fascinating volume is Hunting-
ton's lucid but strained effort to contrast the patterns of political de-
velopment in the United States and Europe.40 Huntington correctly
notes that two aspects of political modernization-the rationalization
of authority and the differentiation of governmental structures-oc-
curred in Europe before occurring in the United States, and on the
Continent before in England.r0 Only participation, a third aspect of
political modernization, occurred earlier in the United States. Yet it
is precisely this occurrence that leads many to maintain that the
United States has preceded most other countries on the path of polit-
ical development.51
Huntington is utterly unpersuasive in his attempt to show that
American political institutions have remained frozen in the Tudor
configuration transported here by dissident seventeenth-century En-
glishmen. His excellent analysis of the great "simplifiers"-those who
centralized power in Europe by inventing the concepts of "Divine
Right" and "sovereignty"--is therefore marred by his excessive pur-
suit of an anomalous aphorism. He eventually misrepresents the Amer-
ican doctrine of separation of powers and considerably distorts the
extent to which political power is differently allocated in Europe and
America. As a result, the aphorisms and metaphors tend to get out
48. Id. 412.
49. Id. ch. 2.
50. Broadly conceived, Huntington's point seems unexceptionable. As he himself
would recognize, however, development manifests important ebbs and flows, even when
it involves building political institutions. Thus while the United States did for some
time lag behind England and the Continent on both of these dimensions, it sometimes
dearly moved ahead. See LaPalombara, Values and Ideologies in the Administrathe Evo-
lution of Western constitutional Systems, in Posrric-rA. Azm ADMWINWsrnTIVE DE '.U.o Mr
166 (R. Braibanti ed. 1969).
51. HUTINGTON 93-94.
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of hand and often suggest empirical observations that Huntington
himself would probably challenge. 52
For a writer with Huntington's stress on the efficacy of institution-
alized centralized power and the role of the political party in provid-
ing it, it may be true that "the Kremlin may well be one of the
most relevant models for many modernizing countries in this cen-
tury."53 As a conclusion or an inference, however, the statement does
not follow from the tortured exercise in history and fact which Hunt-
ington offers in his second chapter. Huntington neglects, for example,
the extent to which the "modernization" of the American govern-
mental structure has made it, for better or for worse, a model which
both European and underdeveloped countries have sought to emulate.
To argue, as he does, that contemporary America is closer than con-
temporary Britain to the age of the Tudors, is to take at formalistic
face value entirely too much about both political systems. To lump
England with the Continental European countries and to contrast
them with the United States on the basis of subtle and complex con-
cepts like the divine right of kings and national sovereignty is to
stretch the facts of history on a conceptual bed that makes Procrustes'
pastime look like child's play. If this particular chapter was included
as an empirical illustration to ease the reader into the propositions
and observations that follow, it might better have been excluded. In
addition to the objections to which it is subject, it needlessly distracts
the reader from the central argument that Huntington pursues.
The central argument itself contains at least two closely-related
theoretical underpinnings that demand clarification-Huntington's
treatment of "social forces" and his conception of the "public interest."
Huntington's analysis of these concepts reveals what to me is an aston-
ishing and unacceptable view of politics.
Social forces, as Huntington conceives them, may be ethnic, reli-
gious, territorial or status groups. When they diversify, proliferate, and
52. "Today America still has a king, Britain only a Crown." Id. 115. "[T]he Ameri.
cans were the first to achieve widespread political participation but the last to modernize
their traditional political structures." Id. 122. "Divided societies cannot exist without
centralized power; consensual societies cannot exist with it." Id. 125. "The United States
thus combines the world's most modem society with one of the world's most antique
polities. The American political experience is distinguished by frequent acts of creation
but few, if any, of innovation." Id. 129. "America . . . was historically a new society
but an old state. Hence the problems of government and political modernization which
the contemporary modernizing states face differ fundamentally from those which ever
confronted the United States." Id. 135. "American society was born modern, and it
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enter politics, governing elites and institutions are confronted with
problems. How can the institutions respond? How can the newcomers
be assimilated? How can the disturbances associated with new entries
be minimized? How can the entering groups be persuaded to play by
the existing rules of the game? These questions are fair and important,
particularly if one is easily made seasick by political boatrocking. It is
also painfully obvious, as Huntington exhaustively illustrates, that
governing elites and institutions are montonously unable to respond
effectively to the social changes from which the questions arise.
Huntington's overall solution for political instability is, alas, essen-
tially metaphysical. Throughout this volume he assumes that the in-
stitutions and procedures associated with government have a reality
and validity that transcend the specific interests that one finds in any
society.5 4 He cannot accept the possibility that social forces may enter
the political system employing their own methods and acting directly
in the political sphere. 5 He is afraid that these "private interests" will
come to dominate or ride roughshod over "public interests." A strongly
institutionalized system, he contends, would require socialization into
the prevailing patterns of resolving issues of public policy as the price
of admission into the political club.56 When unsocialized forces enter
politics in pursuit of their own narrow interests, the outcome is polit-
ical pathology.57 Huntington's concern for socialization is so overpow-
eringly conservative that he is led to view with alarm the emergence
of specialized groups which develop a generalized world view or ideol-
ogy about public policies and which resist incorporation into the pre-
vailing system.5s Taking a position which reveals his underlying pref-
erence for certain aspects of the Anglo-American model, Huntington
would prefer to see such social forces emerge as interest groups whose
narrow demands are moderated, mediated and aggregated by one or
more institutions standing between man and his government.
Private interests are taboo because they cause instability. Yet public
interests are not defined as the will of the people, as something found





58. The "conservatism" implicit in Hungton's concern for socialization must be viewed.
of course, in the context of his emphasis on the highly-disciplined political party as a
critical instrument in nation-building and his admiration for Lenin's elaboration of
Marx. In the strictest sense, both views are conservative, for they seek to prevent orminimize chaotic mass formations.
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from a parallelogram of competing forces, but as the interest of the
governmental institutions themselves!
Rather it is whatever strengthens governmental institutions. The
public interest is the interest of political institutions. It is some-
thing created and brought into existence by the institutionaliza-
tion of governmental organizations. In a complex political system,
many governmental organizations and procedures represent many
different aspects of the public interest. The public interest of a
complex society is a complex matter.5
Is it necessarily the case that what is good for the U.S. Senate, the
C.P.S.U., the British Crown, the U.S. Supreme Court, the M.V.D., the
Department of Defense, or the Fascist Grand Council, is "good" for
the country? It is a complex matter, to be sure, but Huntington's reply
seems clearly, perhaps emphatically, to be "yes."
The matter is surely and obviously complex because, while power
is rarely a zero-sum phenomenon, the growth of power in one sector
of politics or government may represent a loss of practical power in
another. Huntington himself recognizes that the growth of executive
power has taken place not merely at the expense of parochial, locally-
based power, but also at the expense of other institutions operating
at the national level. He may welcome centralizing the executive
power at the cost of limiting legislative or judicial power because it
helps to handle the consequences of modernization efficiently. Or, as
he indicates, the central, executive, power-wielding role of the military
in praetorian societies may be reduced as political parties and other
institutions become strong enough to deal with participation and con-
flict, a solution which he clearly prefers. In order to gauge how much
overall development and decay may be afoot, it seems essential, to use
Huntington's terms, that we acknowledge that deinstitutionalization
may well characterize the process. If this is so, one wonders whether
what is old, stable, adaptable and more institutionalized is always bet-
ter than what may come along to replace kingships, star chambers and
even senates.
The discussion of the public interest, like the analysis of social
forces, requires a more thorough treatment than it receives in this
volume. Without some clarification, we are led to conclude that the
simplest way to assure that the public interest will be served is to find
the ways and means of placing maximum power in the hands of an
institution occupied by a single person. As Huntington says, "The
59. Id. 25.
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function of government is to govern." G° Conceding that, we are still
justified in asking not merely who governs but for what and for whom?
These reflections lead to a comment about the metaphysics. Curi-
ously, Huntington does not want social forces and institutions to be-
come politicized-that is, he does not want them to pursue narrow,
special interests. He wants political institutions to be autonomous. It
is scarcely conceivable that he believes that this has ever been the case
anywhere and that those who man political institutions do not pursue
either their own narrow interests or those of groups or "social forces"
with which they are identified. From an idealistic standpoint in keep-
ing with a noble tradition in Western political thought, it is nice to
think that political institutions may exist essentially removed from, or
above, the group conflicts (class-based or otherwise) that typify orga-
nized societies. But political institutions cannot be reified; one breathes
life into them with considerable difficulty; one divorces them with
even greater complication from those who man them.
0 '
If Huntington is simply trying to identify the forms of political
participation he finds objectionable, or which he correctly holds to
be politically destabilizing (e.g., bribery, riots, strikes, demonstrations,
or coups), he should say so. But to use such examples
2 as evidence
that political participants are failing "to relate their private interests
to a public good" not only confuses the meaning of public interest
but leaves Huntington open to the objection that the prevailing rules
of the game may also and often probably do reflect narrow interests
masquerading as the public good. Indeed, more than one critic of pre-
vailing governmental institutions has suggested that what was believed
to perpetuate or strengthen the "public good" really perpetuated and
aggrandized the narrow interests of only some social forces. The com-
plexities of this matter can be highlighted by a series of questions. Can
the U.S. Senate be divorced from public policies like the oil-depletion
allowance, or the Department of Defense from how much of the na-
tional budget goes into ABM or Vietnam as opposed to our decaying
cities? Can the institution of the Reichchancellor's office be separated
from a decision that produced the most horrendous instance of geno-
cide in human history? Can the national political institutions at Lagos
60. Id. 28.
61. No one will deny that the political institutions as such do condition the behavior
of the transient persons who man them, and that in this sense the "interests" of such
institutions are to some degree different and separate from all other interests in society.
The distinction can be pushed too far, however, and it is possible that this is exactly
what has happened in Huntington's analysis.
62. Similar examples can be found elsewhere in the book. See, e.g., HuN"rTGroi 196-197.
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be abstracted from the agony of Biafra, or the institutions at Jakarta
from the way in which Indonesia responded to the "modernizing" im-
pulse of the P.K.I.?
To call these institutions weak or not sufficiently institutionalized
is to restate rather than to solve the problem of the curious way in
which Huntington defines the public interest. It brings us back to my
initial, deliberate caricature. It is difficult to escape the feeling that
the message of this volume is that what exists governmentally is good
provided it can maintain order. But to identify this particular capa-
bility with the public interest does violence to one's sense of the mean-
ing and of the humanistic instrumental value of social science itself.
This interpretation is probably not at all what Huntington intends;
it is nevertheless an inference from the book that is not, I think, wholly
unwarranted. A formulation that fails to understand that, to some
degree, the Marxian definition of the state as the executive committee
of the dominant "social forces" is a close fit with reality is almost cer-
tainly going to obscure reality and turn metaphysical. That I might
agree with the values that underlie Huntington's metaphysics does not
make his conception of the public interest any less metaphysical.
Notwithstanding these objections, one can agree with Huntington
that the consequences of mobilizing rather than assimilating new social
forces into the existing system will be political chaos and praetorian-
ism.S His notion that a proliferation of organizations-a plurality of
organizations through which participation can be encouraged-is the
quintessence of development is instinctively appealing.04 Indeed, one
must grant Huntington the observation that such a plurality of orga-
nizations is not necesarily, or probably, to occur only under the condi-
tions which presently characterize democratic societies. It is, however,
necessary to add that the problem of "autonomy" he poses for political
institutions applies as well to private organizations. What may be miss-
ing here, therefore, is the idea that political development requires the
"institutionalization" not merely of political bodies but of private-
63. Id. 198.
64. The relationship between demands for participation and other problems or
"crises" in nation-building is the central focus of the published work of the S.SR.C.
Committee on Comparative Politics. The theoretical formulation with which six of Itsmembers have been working, however, specifies that in addition to differentiation of
government organization and the need for capability in political elites, a third dynamicimpluse in the historical processes of nation-building is the search for equality. The de-mand for equality is not metaphysical; it can be abundantly documented by history and
by contemporary development. See the forthcoming L BINDER, J. COLEMAN, J. LAPALOM-
BARA, L. PYE, S. VERBA & M. WEINER, DILEMMAS OF POLrrICAL DEVELOPMENT.
On the definition of political development as the ability of elites to deal with con.tinuous change, see also G. ALMOND & G. POWELL, COMPARATIVE PoLrrxcs: A DEvELo.,MEN-
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sector organizations (like interest groups) as well. As long as there is
some doubt about whose order is being protected (by the army, mon-
arch, political party or otherwise) and to what ends, it is necessary to
refine the notion that institutionalized political power and political
development are one and the same thing.
This indeed is what the message finally boils down to. In pursuing
this theme over several hundred pages, Huntington has forced all of
us to return again to political causes. He has done so at a time when
such redirection of attention is greatly needed, and in a way that com-
pels reassessment of many of the easy generalizations that stem from
the flourishing of cross-disciplinary excursions in recent years. A sal-
utary consequence of Huntington's effort is that it will lead some of
us in other interdisciplinary directions. It is difficult to believe, for
example, that anyone who follows Huntington's line of thought will
fail to recognize the need to explore the role of law and legal institu-
tions as independent instruments guiding political development. In a
sense, we have come full circle, back to some of the earlier concerns
of the political scientist, hopefully alerted to the potential use and
misuse of the wisdom of sister disciplines.
Huntington's last sentence in this volume, "In the modernizing
world he controls the future who organizes its politics,"
'' 5 signals the
re-entry of the constitution makers and political institution builders.
One would hope that it also heralds the arrival of a hierarchy of values
in which power does not perch at the top but serves to promote the
realization of a variety of human needs whose cry for satisfaction spans
the centuries of political community.
TAL APPROAC:H (1966); S. EiFNSrADT, THE POLrTCAL Sysmis OF EMPHRES (1963); PoLrnCAL
MoDENIZAnON iN JAAN AND TuKEa (R. Ward & D. Rustow eds. 1964); L. Py, Asrscrs
OF PormcAL DEvELoPMEr (1966); and A. Diamant, Political Development: Approaches
to Theory and Strategy, in APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT: POLITICS, ADMINISTDATION, AND
CHANGE 15 (J. Montgomery & W. Siffin eds. 1966).
65. HUNTINGrON 461.
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Labor Law in the Legal Curriculum
Donald H. Wollettt
Cases and Materials on Labor Law. By Clyde W. Summers and Harry
H. Wellington. Mineola: Foundation Press, 1968. Pp. xv, 1229. $15.00.
The typical law school course in "Labor Law" is a study of collective
bargaining-that is, of the institutional arrangements and procedures
through which employees participate in making decisions which fix
their wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.
Although the elements of the course in labor law may be treated in
varying orders and with divergent emphases, the basic offering will
uniformly include a history of labor union activity and its regulation
by the courts. It will deal with the statutes which regulate the establish-
ment and maintenance of collective bargaining systems, particularly
with defining the dimensions of the appropriate bargaining unit, select-
ing the employees' organizational representative, and policing the labor
practices of employers and unions. It will focus on management and
labor at the bargaining table, on the scope of bargaining, the use of
strikes and lockouts, and the strategies and tactics, lawful and unlawful,
which affect the bargaining process. Finally, it will consider the enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements through their interpretation
and application, the relationship between the administrative, judicial,
and arbitral forums in the enforcement process, and the protection of
the rights of individual employees against the inequities of majority
rule.
Legislation which directly determines or affects the terms and con-
ditions of employment-wage and hour laws, unemployment insurance
and workmen's compensation-is usually the subject of a separate and
less emphasized course. Intensive treatment of "action" areas-the de-
velopment of structured collective bargaining systems in public em-
ployment and systematic analysis of major social problems such as those
created by racial discrimination in employment-is usually relegated
to advanced seminars.
Even within the relatively narrow curricular focus which teachers of
labor law have adopted, the corpus of labor law has become increasingly
difficult for them to manage. One reason for this difficulty is that the
t Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. A.B. 1941, University of Chicago;LL.B. 1942, Indiana University.
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basic statutory law of collective bargaining has grown enormously. The
Wagner Act,1 enacted in 1935, was a simple statute of limited scope.
The Taft-Hartley amendments2 in 1947 roughly tripled its regulatory
ambit. The Landrum-Griffin Act,3 which came in 1959 at the end of a
second twelve-year cycle, constituted another mammoth increase in the
scope of public regulation of collective bargaining, particularly in
connection with the internal affairs of unions.
In addition, over the past twenty-five years a vast body of decisional
law concerning agreements made by collective bargaining has resulted
from the use of arbitration as the primary mechanism for interpreting
and applying such agreements. The decisions of labor arbitrators-
collected, packaged, indexed and published-now comprise a substan-
tial part of any respectable labor law library.
4
Finally, the National Labor Relations Board has not only seen its
jurisdiction dramatically expanded by the periodic revisions of federal
labor law; it has also manifested a marked disposition to push its stat-
utory power to the hilt and to intrude itself into every nook and cranny
of the collective bargaining process.
A curricular emphasis on collective bargaining is understandable
even though its soundness is not free from doubt. Although collective
bargaining covers less than thirty percent of the work force in the
United States,5 it has greater practical significance than its minority
share of the work force would suggest. Not only are unions strategically
located, but many of the decisions made by collective bargaining affect
the levels of compensation and the working conditions which the un-
organized segment of the labor force enjoys. Furthermore, the most
readily identifiable "labor law practice" for law school graduates is one
which involves serving the institutional participants in the collective
bargaining process. Labor lawyers are employed by corporations, trade
unions, governmental agencies, and serve the private mechanisms of
third-party intervention and dispute settlement. The anticipation of
this specialized practice has led many labor law teachers to lay primary,
if not exclusive, emphasis on collective bargaining in their basic courses.
Yet the traditional study of collective bargaining does not touch
many important questions of labor law. In an affluent society, the per-
1. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198. 49 Stat. 449.
2. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.
3. Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.
4. See, e.g., Mf. BERNsrmIN, PRIVATE DISPuTE SETTLM?,ENT: CASES AND .MATERMLS O%
AsrrBATION (1968); c. UPDEGRAFF s- -v. AicCoy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DLsPrTEs (1961).
5. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATITCS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LAOR STATISTICS
256 (1967).
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sistence of hard core unemployment and underemployment among the
disadvantaged has impelled law teachers to give increasing attention to
the problems of racial discrimination in employment, to the importance
of vocational training or retraining and other proposals and programs
for utilizing the manpower of the nation more effectively, and to the
status of such unorganized and impoverished occupational groups as
migratory farm workers. Collective bargaining, an institution for pro-
tecting the trade union constituency, is not necessarily an appropriate
vehicle for dealing with these problems. Collective bargaining may have
relevance to improving the plight of the agricultural worker, but it
clearly cannot be expected to resolve all the other thorny issues of man-
power policy. While some trade unions may, under given circumstances,
cooperate in programs to alleviate hard core unemployment, others can
be expected to continue to resist the removal of racial barriers in hiring,
skills development and job upgrading.
The rapid development of collective bargaining in public employ-
ment has opened another vast new area of compelling interest. Strikes
by public employees are common, civil service systems are in jeopardy,
and the whole process of making decisions which affect governmental
personnel is under substantial stress. 6 Marked changes in the substance
and style of public administration are likely. And while most civil
servants can hardly be called disadvantaged, there are many disputes in
the public sector which involve the exploitation of workers and have
unmistakable racial implications. The disputes over the efforts of san-
itation workers in Memphis, largely Negroes, to improve their economic
lot by collective bargaining provide a current example.
The constraints of the three-year curriculum and the competing
claims of other subjects may force the teacher of labor law to make
difficult choices of subject matter without having satisfactory criteria
to use for guidance. One might suggest a priori that the labor law
teacher should decide what is to be taught and how it is to be taught on
the basis of a practical judgment as to what will be demanded of a
law graduate if and when he begins to practice labor law. While I would
not suggest the degree of indifference to the "real" world manifested
by one labor law teacher who refuses to teach labor arbitration because
he doesn't "believe in it," I do suggest that attempts to shape the labor
law curriculum on the basis of "market" considerations are futile.
Despite the fact that labor law is usually not a bar examination sub-
6. See Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67
MicH. L. REv. 919, 926-927 (1969).
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ject, it generally is popular with law students. But the relatively small
demand for labor lawyers means that only a few of the students who
take the course will in fact become a part of that esoteric group known
as the "labor law bar." Furthermore, a study done a decade ago by a
Committee of the Section on Labor Relations Law of the American
Bar Association showed that the majority of labor law practitioners
do not regard formal training in this amorphous specialty as having
very much to do with proficiency in its practice.7 If these data are correct,
a labor law teacher who builds his basic course on judgments as to what
knowledge and skills are needed in the practice of labor law is not only
being unresponsive to the needs and interests of most of his students;
he is also engaging in a self-delusive and meaningless exercise.
Professors Summers and Wellington, in this newest of the many text-
books for the basic law course,8 have wisely avoided the pitfall of tail-
oring their materials to the needs of would-be labor lawyers. Instead,
they have produced a collection of cases and materials which they ad-
vertise as the "tentative answer" to the question, "what should be taught
in 'Labor Law' to students who [will] never be labor lawyers?" While
I applaud their refusal to be guided by judgments as to the practical
demands of a labor law practice, I do not understand why the choices
which they made in subject matter and in emphasis are preferable, from
the standpoint of law students who will not practice labor law, to other
choices which they might have made.
Why, for instance, did the authors choose to produce another book
in which the primary subject is collective bargaining? Why did they
decide, in the section of the book dealing with disputes over the inter-
pretation and application of collective bargaining agreements, to play
down the substantial body of arbitral law of collective agreements by
failing to include any arbitrators' decisions and by emphasizing, instead,
judicial and administrative deference to arbitration? Why did they
elect to devote almost seventy pages to a relatively esoteric aspect of
collective bargaining-the applicability of the federal antitrust laws
to unions-while omitting any systematic consideration of the effects
of collective bargaining agreements on the duty to bargain collectively?
In a book devoted to collective bargaining, an institution which devel-
oped primarily because of the inability of the individual worker to
7. ABA LABOR Rm.rTIONS LAw ScnoN, 1960 PROcF-shros 159.
S. C. SrMMERS 8-- H. VEMLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIAL ON LABOR LALW (1968) [herein-
after cited as SuMmmS 9: ELLIN0GTON].
9. SurmERs & WELLINGTON XLii.
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protect and advance his interests, why did they devote nearly one-third
of the material to an analysis of individual rights in the collective struc-
ture, individual rights and the collective agreement, and union govern-
ment and individual rights?
The answers to these questions lie, I think, in the fact that a burgeon-
ing and dynamic subject matter is forcing modern labor law teachers
to develop interests and abilities which are increasingly diverse and
specialized. Some are litigators, who look first to the preparation and
trial of lawsuits, to the niceties of motion practice and to the subtleties
of appellate advocacy. Others are interested primarily in the collective
bargaining process and its fruit, the collective bargaining agreement,
on the theory that what happens at the bargaining table is more impor-
tant than the nitpicking decisions of the N.L.R.B. and the courts. Still
others focus on major contemporary social problems, arguing that the
training and allocation of manpower in response to the needs of the
market should be given first priority and that collective bargaining
should only be studied as one of the obstacles to the effective utilization
of human resources.
Each of the authors of Cases and Materials on Labor Law is an au-
thority in a special area. Professor Wellington works from the premise
of freedom of contract and has an overriding interest in the legal process
and its practical effects on the decisions of the marketplace.1 0 Professor
Summers is a civil libertarian who has a central concern for the sur-
vival of some degree of individual control over life-giving decisions
and who insists that the ultimate test of the social utility of an insti-
tutional arrangement is not what it does for the institution but what it
does for the people whom it purports to serve." Not surprisingly, the
Summers-Wellington book manifests choices based upon these concerns
of the authors. The fact that the subject matter of the book is labor
law is incidental to the central purpose of helping "students better
understand legal processes and institutions.' 2 The study of labor law
is a felicitous vehicle for achieving this purpose because it provides
"instructive examples of more general problems."' 3 The authors have
not "attempted to work out all of the lacework of legal rules created
10. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1968).
11. Professor Summers has written in this area for almost two decades. See, e.g.,
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1951); Summers,
The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YAIL L.J. 175 (1960).
Cf. Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARV. L. REv.
727 (1969).
12. SUMMERS & WELLINGTON Xiii.
13. Id.
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by the busy work of the Board and the courts . .. to include last
minute decisions or citations... [or to describe] the structure or pro-
cedure of collective bargaining or the practical aspects of labor rela-
tions."' 4 Furthermore, they have sometimes used material that might
be considered dated because "it illustrates more effectively than current
materials important problems of legal process."
15
This emphasis explains why, in the introductory chapter, the histor-
ical materials are interpreted in terms of their relation to individual
bargaining, the freedom of "dissenting" (non-union) employees, man-
agement prerogatives, and the political and economic health of the
society .Thus is set the backdrop against which to evaluate and re-eval-
uate the implications of permitting and encouraging the terms and
conditions of employment to be fixed by "private ordering," or "free"
collective bargaining, and the role of the legal process in enhancing,
structuring and curbing this mechanism of private ordering. The focus,
then, is on private ordering and public control, on the distribution of
power between private and public institutions, and on the locus of
public control in a federal system with executive, administrative
and judicial branches.
A number of fundamental questions recur. What is the impact of
collective bargaining on the freedom of contract of management and
of individual employees? What is its impact on political arrangements
and power? What is its impact on the economy? What is the role of the
courts where they function without statutory guidance? How have
public controls worked when the legislature has delegated regulatory
powers to the courts or an administrative agency? What does experience
show with respect to legislative efforts to regulate and to revise reg-
ulation in the light of experience? How should public regulatory
power be allocated between the federal system and the state systems?
What balance should be struck between the advantages of uniformity
and those of limited experimentation?
The basic concerns of Professor Summers and Wellington explain
why they are more interested in the interplay between the judicial, ad-
ministrative and arbitral processes as they operate to enforce collective
bargaining agreements than in the substantive law of those agreements.'
This analysis also explains, illustratively, why the authors devote con-
14. Id. at xiv.
15. Id.
16. Other major labor law casebooks have given far more attention to arbitration
awards. See, e.g., A. Cox & D. BoK, CASES AND MAlERIAL o LAnoR LAw 516-586 (6th ed.
1965).
1281
The Yale Law Journal
siderable space to the application of antitrust concepts to trade unions
and collective bargaining,'7 an area in which legislation gives incom-
plete and ambiguous direction to the courts. The first case they present
is People v. Fisher,'8 which involved efforts to apply, to an early union
effort to increase earnings, a New York statute making it a misde-
meanor to conspire to commit an act injurious to public health,
morals, trade or commerce. There follows an extensive note dealing
with the Sherman Act 19 and its background, the Danbury Hatters case,20
Gompers v. Bucks Stove,21 and Hitchman Coal & Coke. 22 Next is con-
sidered the Clayton Act,2 3 as interpreted in Duplex v. Deering.24 This
section is followed by another extensive note covering the Coronado Coal
cases, 25 United States v. Brims,26 Bedford Cut Stone,27 the Norris-La-
Guardia28 and Wagner 29 Acts, and the Apex Hosiery case.30 After that
comes a note on "executive policy making,"3' followed by the Hutch-
eson32 case and an extensive review of the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.8 3 Finally, there is a discussion of the troublesome remnant of
antitrust law applicable, in 1945, to trade unions and collective bargain-
ing (the Allen Bradley case 34) and of the Pennington8 and Jewel Tea0
cases. The result is a fascinating study of legislative, judicial and ex-
ecutive interaction over the problem of public control of private or-
dering, a problem more perplexing at the end than it was at the begin-
ing.
Interesting as all this is, it is hard not to suspect that the choices of
content and emphasis which the book reflects are more responsive to
the interests of the authors than to the needs of students who do not
17. SUMMERS & WELLINGTON 168-236.
18. 26 N.Y. Com. L. Rep. 9 (1835).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1964).
20. Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
21. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).22. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 202 F.2d 512 (N.D.W.Va. 1912).
23. 15 U.S.C. 12 et seq. (1964).
24. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).25. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Coronado CoalCo. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
26. 272 U.S. 549 (1926).27. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1964).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1964).
30. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).31. The authors refer to the program of criminal enforcement of the anti-trust lawsundertaken by the Department of Justice late in the 1930's. SUM xrns & WELLINGTON
194-196.
32. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
33. SUMMERS 9- WELLINGTON 203-207.
34. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
35. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
36. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 881 U.S. 676 (1965).
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plan to be labor lawyers. The authors' judgment about their students'
needs, on which they claim to base their book, appears to have been
distorted by their special competences. These remarks are not intended
to deprecate the Summers-Wellington book. In my judgment, it is an
excellent collection of materials, punctuated with comments, notes and
questions which in scope and quality are reminiscent of those found in
the best of law teaching books. 37 My point, rather, is one of profound
doubt that it is possible any longer to assemble a single set of materials,
tailored to fit the requirements of the technology of the hard-cover
book publishing business, which can be marketed as the stuff of the
basic labor law course in a law school curriculum. The field is too vast,
too dynamic, and too complex, and the criteria governing choice (or
relevance, if you will) are too ephemeral to make such an enterprise
feasible. Perhaps this is why, although labor law is typically given in
the second or third year of the curriculum as one of the "cultural"
(rather than "bread and butter") offerings, there are five casebooks
listed in the current publishers' catalogues,38 and at least one more is in
the process of production.39
As far as any given labor law book is concerned, I doubt that it can
properly be characterized and evaluated as an "answer" to anything.
It can only be judged, I think, in terms of how well it does its "thing."
In light of this criterion, measured as a study of the effectiveness of
the legal process in dealing with complex social problems and in pro-
tecting the rights of individuals within a vast institutional and bureau-
cratized structure, the Summers-Wellington materials are entitled to
very high marks.
37. See H. M. HART & H. VWECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FnERAL SYsTmx
(1953).
38. The five are A. Cox & D. Box, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw (6th ed.
1965); M. HAimL.ER & P. HAYS, CASES AN MATERIALS o, IAOR Iw (4th ed. 1963);
R. S&irr, L. MAERFIEL & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABoR RELATIONS LAw: CASES AND MATErmAS
(4th ed. 1968); SuarmaNs & WELLINGTON; AND J. WLiwS, LABOR RELATIONS A ,D Tim LAw
(3d ed. 1965).
89. The authors of this work are W. Oberer, K. Hanslowe and G. Schatzki. Its pro-
jected title is CASES AND MATERIAL oN LABOR LAW: COLLEctrVE BARGAINING IN A FREE
SocIErY.
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